






Abstract. Sartre poses in Being and Nothingness a challenge to Freud which repays close 
attention. Sartre's argument focusses on Freud's concept of the censor, a mechanism or 
agency responsible for determining which mental contents are admitted to consciousness. 
Whether or not his argument shows a contradiction or other logical fault in psychoanalytic 
explanation, it is enough for Sartre to have forced Freud's naturalistic assumptions out into 
the open and traced their implications, in order for him to have put pressure on Freud. The 
question which we are left with, concerning what we are to think of psychoanalysis in 
philosophical respects, reflects our broader difficulty in attuning our naturalistic 
commitments and our prima facie non-naturalistic self-conception. 
 
The philosophical controversies surrounding psychoanalysis with which we are most familiar 
concern its scientific standing or, as its detractors allege, lack thereof. This provides a fruitful set of 
terms for evaluating psychoanalysis, however, only to the extent that scientificity is thought to be 
necessary in order for Freud's ideas to have value, and a quick glance at the mountain of 
psychoanalytically inspired work in the humanities shows that this is highly doubtful: 
psychoanalysis holds appeal and is reckoned to have importance, not because it is believed to offer 
a back door into the essence of the mind, bypassing the usual forms of access, but on the contrary 
because of the way in which it coheres with all of the other forms of sense making that we employ. 
If psychoanalysis should be counted a science, it belongs among the human sciences, whose 
methods are diverse, largely continuous with our folk practice of crediting one another with beliefs 
and desires, and for the greater part not shared by the natural sciences. To say this is of course not to 
say that Freud's claims are true, but to indicate their proper measure. This, at any rate, is how Sartre 
understands Freud – as attempting to render theoretically perspicuous certain puzzling 
psychological phenomena that we encounter in ourselves and others in which there appears to be a 
motivated failure of self-knowledge. This plane of consideration is ethical as much as explanatory: 
self-deception, like weakness of will, is inconsistent with sincerity and full integrity, while honesty 
with oneself and courage in facing up to one's feelings are virtues; self-knowledge matters in ways 
that are not merely epistemic. Sartre's criticisms are consequently of a different order from those of, 
say, Karl Popper, and they reveal more of the philosophical significance of Freud's ideas. 
 
1. Sartre's argument 
 
Let us begin by spelling out Sartre's argument in Being and Nothingness.1 The explicit object of his 
attack is Freud's concept of an agency or mechanism, referred to as the censor,2 which determines 
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the relation of mental contents to consciousness, either by refusing unconscious elements admission 
to consciousness, the system Cs., or by exiling previously conscious elements to the unconscious, 
Ucs. Such exclusions – acts of repression, Verdrängung – are adduced to explain the perplexing 
cognitive failures and seeming irrationality of subjects encountered inside and outside the 
psychoanalytic consulting room: the analysand's heated and indignant repudiation of the construal 
of his motives which the evidence clearly supports, a person's inability to recognize her actions as 
bearing a significance which is plain to all around, and so on. The agency responsible for repression 
is conceived by Freud as strictly non-identical with the person as a whole, of whom it forms merely 
a proper part. The metapsychology appears furthermore to be modelled closely on the 
intersubjective case: communication between the parts of a single person's mind is held to break 
down in the same way that communication can break down between different people. Hence 
Sartre's remark, 'psychoanalysis places me in the same relation to myself as the Other is in respect 
to me' – the analyst is conceived as playing the role of a mediating third party, an Other who 
restores communication between the part of the analysand from which awareness is withheld (Cs.) 
and the part which contains the withheld item (Ucs.). The principle of individuation of mental parts 
in Freudian theory – its distinctions of Cs., Ucs., and intermediating censor mechanism, or in 
Freud's later theory, of id, ego, and superego – thus owes something to our pre-theoretical 
conception of the distinction of one mind or person from another. 
 Now for the problem, as Sartre sees it: In order to do the work that Freud asks of it, the 
censor is required to know of the threat posed by the unconscious content to the interests of 
consciousness and to share its aim of self-protection. And in order to execute its task of keeping the 
anxiety-inducing idea away from Cs., the censor is required to sponsor various doxastic projects – 
incriminating counter-evidence must be reconstrued, awkward questions must be deflected, etc. – in 
ways which demand full rights of access to the mind and world of the subject. Psychoanalytic 
explanation, in so far as it turns on the postulation of the censor or some functional equivalent – and 
it does so essentially – is therefore non-explanatory: in truth and in effect the censor is the person as 
a whole, under a particular description. The censor mechanism 'within' me just is me qua bringing it 
about, determining, that I do not avow my motives, wishfully attribute to myself false qualities, etc. 
If the censor is stripped of its rationality, then it deflates to a point where it is explanatorily useless; 
but if it is attributed the capacity to do what Freud demands of it, then it inflates to person-sized 
proportions. Hence the contradiction: the psychoanalytic censor is both part and whole, both non-
rational mechanism and non-mechanical rational agent. 
 The original puzzle was to explain how I can lie to myself. Psychoanalysis answers: By 
virtue of the censor mechanism. But that concept is empty, Sartre contends, for it simply recycles, 
behind a screen of theoretical terminology, the explanandum in the verbal shape of an explanans. 
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More broadly we can see, Sartre believes, that the whole strategy of mental partition employed by 
Freud is ill-conceived: the unity of the person is sui generis, undecomposable, conceptually 
primitive. The para-intersubjective modelling of the mind in psychoanalytic metapsychology is, 
moreover, not simply confused but a case of complicity: the self-deceived subject puts themselves 
forwards implicitly as an innocent victim of deception, and the psychoanalytic theoretician buys 
their story, constructing a whole theory of mind in accordance with their self-serving illusion of 
having merely, passively, suffered a psychological misfortune, in the same morally innocuous way 
that one can be simply unable to recall a telephone number. Freudian theory thereby underwrites the 
psychological and moral failings of human beings. 
 It must now be asked, with a view to seeing what defence may be available to Freud, if 
Sartre has made assumptions with which issue may be taken issue. Sartre cannot be charged with 
having assumed dogmatically that unconscious mental states are a conceptual or metaphysical 
impossibility, or that the mind necessarily enjoys inescapable total rational transparency – he does 
hold both views, but in this context he has granted Freud, for the sake of argument, what is required 
for formulation of the psychoanalytic hypothesis. Sartre may nonetheless seem to have begged the 
question in so far as he supposes that the operations of the censor involve the attribution to it of 
beliefs and desires which bring it into effective identity with the person as a whole. Granted that its 
psychic agency cannot be genuinely mechanical in the manner of a physical process – since it 
operates on mental content, which cannot be acted on without being in some way understood – why 
can it not still be much more rationally limited, more mechanism-like, than a full-blown rational 
agent? It is after all integral to the programme of homuncular explanation, or faculty theory, as we 
encounter it in more generally in psychology, that homunculi and faculties are accorded limited 
powers and ranges of function – the faculty of memory can do no more than store and retrieve 
memories, the module of word-recognition can only process linguistic representations, etc.3 It is 
also highly relevant that ordinary psychology acknowledges a vast range of psychological 
phenomena which involve intentionality but not rationality, perhaps not even conceptualization: the 
finger movements of a professional pianist, the subliminal awareness of the increasing weight of an 
object that makes me tighten my grip, the anticipation of attack that pushes all else out of mind, and 
so on. These form not only the penumbra of mental life but also, it may be argued, give evidence of 
a supporting substrate without which rational reflective consciousness would collapse.4 In short, can 
Freud not respond to Sartre by invoking the homuncularist strategy of functional analysis, in 
conjunction with an appeal to the ordinary idea of sub-rational, pre-conceptual intentionality? If so, 
then the seemingly intersubjective character of Freud's mental divisions is an inessential distraction; 
though of heuristic value, it is not part of what the theory holds true. 
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 It depends on what we think the facts are in the relevant kinds of case, and on how we 
understand the total phenomenon of a person's self-deception or motivated self-ignorance. If all that 
the censor need do is block episodes of consciousness, then the 'rule' governing its behaviour does 
not imply significant rationality: it can unconsciously deflect ideas with a particular affective 
quality or associative power in roughly the way that we instinctively avert our gaze from obscene or 
abhorrent sights. If however the 'mechanisms of defence', as Freud calls them, stretch to 
complicated doxastic manoeuvres, then Sartre's argument is well grounded. In order to progress on 
this front it would be necessary therefore to examine actual case histories in some detail. 
 The second point is the crux of the matter and not contingent on the details. Suppose we 
accept the psychoanalytic account of what goes on when, say, a patient resists the interpretation of 
the analyst. Resistance is thus analysed into the interactions of mental parts. And yet it remains the 
case that we understand the person as a whole in such cases as working against themselves, i.e. as 
exhibiting a self-relation. That is why psychoanalysis can advertise itself as a form of emancipation, 
as liberating the subject from her own counter-purposivity. (Compare cases of defective 
performance where no self-relation is involved – inability to wake up, or to add up a set of numbers. 
To restore such capacities is, as in physical medicine, to empower but not to liberate.) Now the 
question is this: Since according to psychoanalysis the self-relation involved in repression and 
resistance is a function of mental parts, (why) should we not treat self-relations in general as 
supervening on and made true by the interrelations of mental components? Psychoanalysis seems to 
make exactly such a claim in, for example, the context of morality: to sacrifice the gratification of 
an appetite for the sake of duty, just is for certain sorts of relations to obtain between id, ego, and 
superego. In so far as psychoanalysis does not, in such cases, claim to have shown the non-
existence of its explanandum – Freud is not Nietzsche – what it must claim to be offering is a form 
of realist reduction, that is, an account which reveals the underlying reality of moral self-relations 
and shows what it is that enables us to determine ourselves in accordance with duty. To the extent 
that self-relations are held to be conceptually problematic – and the worry that self-consciousness, 
self-knowledge, and self-determination may be incoherent has a long history5 – it would seem that 
there is reason to welcome partitive analysis as freeing reflexivity from paradox. Pursuing this line, 
psychoanalysis might join forces with cognitive psychology in its endeavour to map the sub-
personal modular realm.6 
 Sartre, however, believes that partitive analysis is incompatible with self-relations. His 
reasons are brought out in a different and perhaps clearer way in his discussion of psychoanalytic 
symbolism, in Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions.7 Here he is concerned with a different type of 
relation between Ucs. and Cs., as it were the next stage in the standard psychoanalytic sequence: 
Having undergone repression, unconscious ideas and the desires formed around them do not of 
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course disappear but retain their force, and one of the several possible results of their continued 
search for fulfilment is symbol-formation: cued by some associative connection, an object 
accessible to consciousness becomes by substitution the vehicle of expression for the repressed 
idea; the conscious object, invested with the significance of the unconscious idea, symbolizes the 
latter, such that the gratification consciously taken in the object at the same time fulfils (or at any 
rate appeases) the unconscious desire – Cs.'s relation to X satisfies Ucs.'s wish for Y, because X 
'means' Y. 
 Sartre's criticism of this model follows the earlier pattern. In order for Cs.'s relation to X to 
have positive significance for Ucs.'s desire for Y, it is necessary for the symbolic relation between 
X and Y to be registered. Now, where is this registration, S's grasp of the 'X = Y' equation, located? 
It cannot be in Cs., since that would make the unconscious meaning of X an open secret; but if it is 
in Ucs., then Ucs. is either itself a divided subject of belief, for whom both X = Y and X ≠ Y, or 
Ucs. is a subject for whom X has a symbolic significance, which is the very explanandum we 
started with. Again what is supposed to be an explanation at the level of mental parts is shown to 
involve a sleight of hand: the terms of the causal relations plotted in psychoanalytic explanation are 
officially sub-personal, but psychoanalytic explanation tacitly invokes a perspective on the mental 
whole which must be available to the subject herself – not only can we theoreticians see what the 
configuration of S's mental parts adds up to, but S herself must be able to see this. The upshot of 
Sartre's argument is then as follows: If psychological reality consists in nothing but the causal 
interactions postulated by psychoanalysis, then it is false that X 'symbolizes' Y for S – rather their 
relation is external, in the way that (in Sartre's example) ashes give evidence that a fire was once 
made on this spot; but if it is true that X means Y for S, then X's-meaning-Y-for-S ('S's taking X as 
Y') cannot receive a partitive analysis.8 
 To see what is at stake here we may briefly consider a well-known argument of Kant's from 
the Third Paralogism of the Critique of Pure Reason. Here Kant entertains the hypothesis that at 
each instant a numerically different substance might be the subject of my consciousness, each 
substance passing on its accrued stock of representations to its successor, as one billiard ball 
transfers its motion to the next.9 Might this not be, for all we known, the metaphysical reality 
underlying self-consciousness over time? Kant deals with this possibility by showing that our first-
person conception of ourselves as thinkers entitles, in fact it requires, us to set it aside: if the 
conjecture were true, then the different parts of a judgement (or different steps in an argument) 
would be thought by different subjects, and so no judgement at all (or reasoning) would take place – 
there would be no thought 'A is F' (or inference from 'p→q' and 'p' to 'q'), since the thinker-of-
A('p→q' and 'p') would be non-identical with the thinker-of-F('q'), and their mere temporal 
succession, however immediate, would not suffice for the logical connection expressed in the 
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copula (or the application of modus ponens); any more than your utterance of 'promise' after my 
utterance of 'I' gives rise to an obligation. But we cannot think – judge – that we do not think; ergo 
etc. 
 In the Paralogisms, Kant has Cartesians in mind, whereas Sartre's target is a naturalistic 
psychology, but the form of argument is the same (thus the argument of the Third Paralogism has 
equal application to naturalistic accounts of the grounds of thought). In the same way that the unity 
of a thinker cannot be reduced to an aggregate of substances with representations – in more strictly 
Kantian terms: a thinker cannot cannot take herself qua thinker to consist in such – Sartre argues for 
the inconsistency of self-relations with a merely aggregative psychological manifold: in so far as 
Dora or the Ratman accept that Freud has shown them something about how they feel towards their 
fathers, they cannot regard their father-love/-hatred as the kind of thing that could be modelled in 
Freud's metapsychology; to do so would be to set it outside the bounds of their self, logically on a 
par with physiological processes occurring in their bodies (Sartre points out the self-alienation: 
according to Freud, 'I am the ego but I am not the id'). 
 Other dimensions of the disagreement of Freud and Sartre confirm that the features of 
psychoanalytic metapsychology that draw Sartre's fire are indeed closely bound up with Freud's 
naturalism. 
 Mental partition makes sense if and only if mental states or contents are the sorts of things 
that allow themselves to be treated 'topographically', i.e. regarded as capable of having, and 
changing, locations. Irrespective of whether Freud professes materialism, the only conception of 
'ideas' or 'mental contents' that makes sense for the purposes of the metapsychology is in effect 
materialist: whether or not he reduces them to neural events, Freud supposes them to behave like 
material entities, as discrete entities endowed with quantities of energy and externally related 
through efficient causality. Sartre's short argument against this conception is this: If it is true that 
'the mental' consists of discrete items with an exclusively empirical identity – and is therefore not 
constituted by self-consciousness in the way that the Kantian tradition supposes – then we can form 
no coherent conception of what it is for a mental 'state' or 'content' to be conscious. As Sartre puts it, 
consciousness becomes something – an evanescent diaphanous quality – contingently attached to 
mental content like a sticker.10 But consciousness cannot grasp itself in that form: for me to know I 
believe p is not for me to be aware of a p-content as having some special radiance or any other 
property. 
 This difference in their conception of the nature of mind is connected to another, deep and 
obvious, point of disagreement. In line with his commitment to the neural basis of mental 
phenomena, Freud regards the 'psychic apparatus' as governed by deterministic laws, and so can 
only admit compatibilist forms of freedom.11 For Sartre, famously, the human subject is constituted 
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by freedom of a radical, non-compatibilist sort. Again the issue is connected closely with that of 
partition: however non-compatibilistic freedom is understood, it cannot coherently be localized at a 
particular point on a diagram of the mind; rather, self-determination demands an irreducible 
reflexivity.12 
 
2. Freedom and Nature  
 
Freud stands confidently in the nineteenth-century German tradition of empirical psychology, 
stemming from Johann Friedrich Herbart and Hermann von Helmholz. Sartre's assault on 
psychoanalysis is a restatement of the anti-naturalistic humanistic libertarian standpoint of classical 
German philosophy. It is no coincidence that the issue which occupies Sartre is expanded on by 
Hegel in his Philosophy of Mind: 
 
Empirical psychology has as its object the concrete mind and, after the revival of the 
sciences, when observation and experience had become the principal foundation for 
knowledge of concrete reality, such psychology was pursued in the same way. Consequently 
the metaphysical element was kept outside this empirical science, and so prevented from 
getting any concrete determination or content, while the empirical science clung to the 
conventional intellectual metaphysics of forces, various activities, etc., and banished the 
speculative approach [...] The essential aim of a philosophy of mind can only be to 
reintroduce the concept again into the knowledge of mind.13 
 
The 'concept' missing from empirical psychology is what is responsible for the mind's real unity. 
Hegel adds that 'the self-feeling of the mind's living unity spontaneously resists the fragmentation of 
the mind into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, represented as 
independent of each other'.14 This complaint echoes a criticism levelled by Schelling against an 
early post-Kantian attempt (of K. L. Reinhold) to ground freedom in an autonomous 'faculty' of free 
choice: 
 
A completed science shuns all philosophical artifices by which the I itself is taken apart and 
split into faculties which are not thinkable under any common principle of unity. The 
completed science does not aim at dead faculties that have no reality and exist only in 
artificial abstractions. It aims rather at the living unity of the I, which is the same in all 
manifestations of its activity. In that science all the different faculties and actions that 
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philosophy has ever named become one faculty only, one action of the one and same 
identical I.15 
 
 The idealism expounded by thinkers from Kant to Hegel and belatedly re-espoused by 
Sartre, has presumably had its day, but its thesis of the irreducible reality of the self has not passed 
into history: we do not and could not give up the conception of persons as ontologically preeminent; 
without it, the moral and political values of modernity would lack foundation and purpose. And yet 
at the same time we grant that the mind is a legitimate object of scientific enquiry, and anticipate 
deriving benefits from the results thereof. Psychoanalysis is a mirror of this double commitment, in 
a way that Sartre's criticism brings to light: Sartre is able to argue against psychoanalysis on 
grounds of internal inconsistency – as opposed to merely counter-asserting his own libertarian 
metaphysics – only because it contains both naturalistic and non-naturalistic elements; it both 
abandons the personal plane for the sake of sub-personal reality, in the metapsychology, and affirms 
its integrity, in so far as psychoanalysis in its therapeutic practice addresses the subject in her full 
self-conscious personhood. 
 Where does all this leave us, as regards psychoanalysis? The options may be reduced to 
three.  
 First, we may aim to free psychoanalysis from its naturalism. The conceptual difficulties 
highlighted by Sartre do not mean that there is no truth in psychoanalysis, and Sartre himself is 
fully persuaded that Freud is on the correct path: though Freud is mistaken in thinking that the 
grounds of human motivation lie in animality, he is absolutely right, Sartre maintains, to believe 
that depth-psychological interpretation, going beyond the characterizations of common sense 
psychology, is required in order to make human beings genuinely intelligible. Sartre proposes 
accordingly an 'existential psychoanalysis' which seeks to determine the original, freely chosen 
project that defines each individual.16 
 Another, more influential attempt to salvage Freud's insights by prising these apart from his 
naturalistic misconception, again guided by the idealist aim of determining the conditions of human 
freedom but opposed to the idea that these are located within the individual subject, is found in 
Jürgen Habermas.17 The key to a correct representation of psychoanalytic ideas, Habermas argues, 
lies in the concept of communication, which we have already seen to be central to its concerns but 
which Habermas understands in a new way: since psychoanalytic thought has its starting point in 
distortions of meaning in the analytic context and aims at a restoration of transparent public 
communication, which provides the measure of the enlightenment achieved by the analysand, 
psychoanalytic metapsychology should be understood as 'the logic of interpretation in the analytic 
situation of dialogue'.18 As a depth-hermeneutics committed to emancipation, psychoanalysis 
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belongs among the human sciences: 'the categorial framework of psychoanalysis is tied to the 
presuppositions of the interpretation of muted and distorted texts by means of which their authors 
deceive themselves'.19 
 Second, we might aim to make psychoanalysis rigorously naturalistic.20 What this amounts 
to will depend chiefly upon the view taken of how naturalism constrains psychology. On an extreme 
view, it requires nothing less than identifying neural referents for psychoanalytic concepts. The 
principal question which the second option raises therefore is whether psychoanalytic theory, in 
allowing itself to be subsumed within some more general programme of psychological explanation, 
one which takes its cue from evolutionary theory or brain science rather than the concepts and 
problems of common sense psychology, will find that its claims stand up to such scrutiny, and 
continue to be capable of underwriting psychoanalysis as a distinctive therapeutic practice. 
 Both of the preceding accept the incompatibility of naturalism with our fundamental self-
conception. The third option is to attempt their conciliation. In so far as the requisite concepts do 
not lie ready to hand, novel theoretical construction is called for, and here again we are referred 
back to classical German philosophy. Though one wing of the post-Kantian development held fast 
to Kant's dualism of Freedom and Nature, another aimed at its overcoming. Hegel, again: 
 
But the need for comprehension here is stimulated even more by the oppositions, which at 
once present themselves, between the mind's freedom and the mind's determinism, of the 
free agency of the soul in contrast to the bodiliness external to it, and again the intimate 
connection between the two. In experience too the phenomena of animal magnetism in 
particular have given, in recent times, a visible confirmation of the substantial unity of the 
soul, and of the power of its ideality. Before these phenomena, the rigid distinctions of the 
intellect are thrown into disarray; and the necessity of a speculative examination for the 
dissolution of the contradictions is displayed more directly.21 
 
 It is highly significant that Hegel, seeking an empirical manifestation of the substantial unity 
of free mind and bodily mind, should refer to Mesmer's attempt to cure nervous illness by means of 
hypnosis, for it was with hypnotism as a treatment for hysteria that Freud's psychological researches 
began. Hegel does not however intend to offer mesmerism as a proof of the relevant underlying 
identity – on his account, speculative philosophy is needed to dissolve what are, for ordinary human 
understanding, insuperable contradictions. Suppose we agree with Hegel that unification is the 
proper theoretical goal, but doubt his speculative method. In what ways might psychoanalysis try to 
work towards it? 
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 There are some obvious ways in which a start can be made, and which we find explored in 
post-Freudian thought, especially the Kleinian school and object-relations theory. Here the more 
crudely biologistic cum mechanistic features of Freudian explanation – drive understood as sheer 
instinctual pressure, subject to a law of homeostasis – are excised in favour of a conception of 
unconscious activity as consisting in forms of thinking directed at distinctive objects, compounds of 
the real and the phantastical located in an inner world. 
 This is a beginning, but more is needed. In a recent paper, Jonathan Lear offers an account 
of psychoanalysis which allows us to specify what this is.22 As Lear formulates it, in Aristotelian 
vocabulary, the aim of psychoanalysis is to put the rational and non-rational parts of the soul in 
communication with another and, by informing the non-rational with reason, to bring it about that 
they speak in the same voice: when this is achieved, the subject experiences her self-conscious 
speech as the unison of plural, concerted voices, and as efficacious. Whether this overcomes Sartre's 
sticking point depends on whether we can be thought to be capable of forming a new concept, 
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